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IN1 THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
DIANE DEVERAUX, 
a minor, 
and 
·~ the Matter of· the Adoption of 
. GENE DEVERAUX, ' 
a minor. 
APPELLANT'S. BRIEF 
'1', 
~.;Appeal From The District Court Of The F'ourth Judicial 
· District, In And For Utah County, State Of Utah 
Honil~eph E. Nelson, Judge 
V \'L ,cs3 
QC\ 2 .,. GUS~.N,..RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
~f. -----~-----;-&;~.itM~eys for Rhea Walker Brown, 
~ .. ~ .. ~-0;;~. suprel1l Protestant 0/IUl,. Appellant. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the :Jiatter of the Adoption of 
. DIANE DEYERAUX, 
a minor, 
and 
In the :Jia tter of the Adoption of 
GEXE DEYERAFX, 
a minor. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 8055 
Case No. 8056 
By order of this Court the appeal in connection with 
the adoption proceedings of Diane Deveraux and Gene 
Deveraux have been consolidated. The facts in each case 
are identical with the exception of a slight difference con-
cerning the nature of the individual children and their 
reaction in foster homes and with their adopting parents. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 31st day of August, 1950 the Juvenile Court 
of the Third Judicial District, in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, made and entered its decree declaring that 
the natural parents, Ellis Deveraux and Rhea Walker 
Deveraux (Rhea Walker Brown, appellant), were unfit 
and improper persons to have the care, custody, control 
and guardianship of said children, committing the 
children to the Utah Ntate Department of Public Welfare 
for foster home care, treatment and supervision. The 
decree, in part, states as follows: 
'·IT IS FrRTHER ORDERED, by the Court 
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene and Dianne Dev-
eraux be and they (are) hereby declared and 
adjudged to be dependent, neglected, children 
within the 1neaning of the laws of Utah, in such 
cases made and provided, and that subject to the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, the said: 
children be committed to the Utah State Depart-
ment of Public Vvelfare for foster home care, 
treatment, and supervision. And it is further 
ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis 
Deveroux pay $100.00 per month for their support 
and maintenance." (Tr. 5-!, 246). 
Thereafter the children were placed in the home of 
:Mr. and Mrs. Lindberg (Tr. 134, 196, 214). Later on the 
children were placed in different foster homes. On the 
17th day of January, 1951 Gene Deveraux was placed in 
the home of Clyde D. Sandgren and Zola M. S.andgren, 
his wife (Tr. 140), and on the 6th day of February, 1951 
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Diane DeYeraux \Ya.s placed 1n the hon1e of Ray Cole 
:Stickney and Dona ~lerl Stickney, his wife (Tr. 140); 
that on the 9th day of January, 1D51 Rhea Walker Brown, 
fonnerly Rhea Deveraux, in the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State 
of Utah, obtained a decree of divorce from the said 
Elli.s Deverau.x (Tr. 65); that throughout the period of 
time frmn 'vhen the children were taken from their 
natural parents appellant, pursuant to the Juvenile Court 
decree, made payrnents for their support ( Tr. 85), 
inquired as to their well-being (Tr. 67) and asked to see 
thern but was advised that the Welfare Department 
thought it would be best for her 'not to visit with the 
children (Tr. 78); that F. M. Alder, the Judge of the 
Juvenile Court for the Third District, who acted as 
attorney for appellant in her divorce suit, wrote to appel-
lant on the lOth day of February, 1951 the following 
letter: 
".Jirs. Rhea Deveraux, 
Tooele, Utah. 
Dear l\[rs. Deveraux: 
Thank you for the inclosure of the money 
order, which completes final payment. 
It is likely best that you have moved to 
Tooele, and the other things that you mention 
regarding your future are also desirable. Let me 
suggest again, that after you are married, that 
you AGAIN get married after the six months 
have expired, so as to make your marriage legal. 
Under the present conditions you should get mar-
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ried as soon as you can conveniently. Of course, 
~'our future prospects and conduct will determine 
the results as to the children. 
You surely have my best wishes. 
\' ery truly yours, 
(signed) F. ~1. ALDER" (Tr. 244), 
copy of \\'lti(·h wa~ submitted in evidence as Exhibit "2" 
(Tr. 11-1-), and on the 11th day of ~fay, 1951 he again 
wrote to appellant the following letter: 
".:\l rs. Rhea Brown 
Tooele 
Utah 
Dear ~Irs. Brown: 
The contents of your letter of .:\Iay 9th have been 
read and noted. I am glad that you are married 
and I wish you eYery suecess and all the happiness 
that can be obtained in your marriage. 
~.\s to your children, don't worry about them 
because the gossip about adoption by July cannot 
I H' anything but gossip and ~-ou do not need to 
worry about that as there is no time, within a 
reasonable time, that such procedure ever occurs. 
The best advice I can give you at the present time 
is that you try to make your present marriage a 
~nccess and let the future take care of itself as 
it comes along. Your children are in good hands 
so that you need not worry about their being 
cared for. 
The papers you asked for will have to be kept 
here by me in my files so that they will be avail-
able to me at all times and if you got them you 
might lose them.. ' 
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5 
\Yishing you the best that life can afford, I 
rmnain, 
~inrerely yours, 
THIRD .TlTYENILE DISTRICT 
corRT 
(signed) F. 1\L ALDER 
F. :.M. Alder 
Judge" (Tr. 2-1:3), 
copy of which \Yas adn1itted in evidence as Exhibit "1" 
(Tr. 11-1:). 
That on April ~' 1952 the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, State 
of l::-tah, entered a decree of adoption of the minor child 
Gene DeYeraux (Tr. 4-5), and on the 4th day of June, 
1952 said court entered a decree of adoption for the 
child Diane Deveraux (Tr. 6-7). No notice of hearing 
on the petition for the adoption in either case was given 
to appellant and, in fact, the first knowledge that 
the mother of said children had concerning said adoption 
was a day or two after the adoption orders had been 
entered (Tr. 65). Thereupon appellant immediately con-
tacted 1\L Earl Marshall, then a practicing attorney in 
Tooele, Utah (Tr. 66), and on or about the 8th day of 
July, 195~ she filed in said District Court for the Fourth 
.Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, 
a complaint seeking a writ of habeas corpus and custody 
of the said children (Tr. 68, 126). This habeas corpus 
matter has never been finally determined. 
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That thereafter appellant was served with notice 
that the two adoption matters would come up for hearing 
on a <·<>rtain day and said matters came on for hearing 
on F<>bruary -1-, 1953. At the hearing the decrees of 
adoption heretofore entered by Judge Dunford and 
.Judg<> Tuckett were vacated (Tr. 30). Testimony was 
offered on behalf of petitioners concerning the. allega-
tions in their petitions for adoption and the father of 
said ehildren, Ellis E. Deveraux, executed his written 
consent to the adoption of each child (Tr. 35, 55), and 
it was stipulated that .J[r. and .Jlrs. Stickney and Mr. 
and ~l rs. Sandgren were fit and proper persons to adopt 
the respective children (Tr. -1-!, 56). 
Prior to the taking of testimony, and after the testi-
mony above set forth was offered, appellant filed her 
written motion (Diane Deveraux Tr. 9, Gene Deveraux 
Tr. G) and made an oral motion (Tr. 52, 62) to dismiss 
the petitions for adoption upon the following grounds: 
( 1) there was another action pending; (2) that the 
Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction; (3) that the 
consent for adoption had never been given by the natural 
mother; and ( -1) that the children had never been placed 
in a children's aid society pursuant to Section 55-10-40, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, nor had the Juvenile Court 
authorized the adoption pursuant to Section 55-10-43, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. These motions were denied 
(Tr. 63) and further hearing was had in said matter. 
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The eYidence di~rlo~es that after appellant had been 
divorced fr01n her former husband she married her 
present husband, HenryBrown (Tr. 65), and is living at 
~tockton. rtah ( Tr. 6-±), and that she had changed her 
manner of living by stopping her drinking (Tr. 77, 98). 
It wa8 shown that she was a fit and proper person to 
have the care and custody of her children (Tr. 94, 102, 
108, 109). :Jir. Brown, husband of appellant, testified 
that he made $5200.00 a year ( Tr. 92), that he was per-
fectly "\vi!Jing to have :Jirs. Brown have the children, and 
that he would take care of them and treat them as his 
own children ( Tr. 9-1). 
:Mrs. Eloise :Jiorley, social worker, testified that 
from a psychological point of view she thought it would 
be again~t the interests of the children to have them 
transferred frorn their present locations back to their 
mother (Tr. 200). :Jirs. Elsa V. Harris, social worker, 
testified to the same effect (Tr. 218). Dr. Walter T. 
Hasler, who specializes in eye, nose and throat (Tr. 180), 
gave his opinion as to the effect of moving Gene from 
the Sandgren home (Tr. 183). On cross examination he 
stated that the manner in which Gene was treated in the 
future, if his home was changed, would have a great deal 
of bearing on the matter (Tr. 184A). Mark K. Allen, 
a psychologist and teacher at the Brigham Young Uni-
versity, gave his opinion that it would be detrimental to 
move the children (Tr. 228-231). On cross examination 
he stated that in some cases he thought the State should 
have control of children and that if there was friction in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the home, or if there was not moral stability and the 
(·hildren would get along a little better if taken out of 
tlw l1ome of the natural parents, then the child should be 
remov<'d ( Tr. ~:n-~:t~). 
:\'mtwrou~ other witnesses te~tified as to the chil-
dn•n's l,('havior since being placed in the home of the 
adopting parenb and as to their care and treatment in 
~mid home~. .A~ it has already been stipulated that the 
adopting parents are proper and fit persons to have the 
<·ustody and control (Jf said children, we did not deem it 
necessary or material to set forth in this statement of 
l'ad~ where this testimony might be found. 
On the 27th day of :Jlay, 1953 the court made and 
entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
in both of said matters (Diane Deveraux Tr. 17-22, Gene 
Deveraux Tr. 15-20), granting the adoption of said chil-
dren by the respective adopting parents. 
STATE:JIEXT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A. The Juvenile Court Had Exclusive Jurisdiction of 
The Care, Custody And Control Of The Minor 
Children. 
B. The Natural Parents Had Not Been Permanently 
Deprived Of The Custody Of The Minor Children. 
C. Written Consent For Adoption Is Required From 
The Natural Mother Or, If Not, From The Juvenile 
Court Or Children's Aid Society. 
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II. THE \YELFARE OF A CHILD IS NOT THE 
P~-\RAMOUNT ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE COURT 
HAS JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO PERMIT AN 
ADOPTION. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-
SIONS OF LA\V AND DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE JUVENILE COURT DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN REPORT OF THE 
TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
A. The Court Erred In Finding That The Juvenile 
Court Permanently Deprived The Natural Parents 
Of Custody Of Said Children. 
B. The Court Erred In Making Its Findings Of Fact 
10 And 11. 
C. The Court Erred In Making Its Conclusions of Law 
1, 2 And 3. 
D. The Court Erred In Failing To Make A Finding As 
To Whether The Mother Was, Or Was Not, A Fit 
And Proper Person To Have The Custody Of Her 
Children. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
A. The Juvenile Court Had Exclusive Jurisdiction of 
The Care, Custody And Control Of The Minor 
Children. 
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The Juvenile Court was the first one to take juris-
did ion ov<'r the minor children here in question. That 
C'onrt, after proper notice, held that the children were 
dPpPnd<>nt and neglected. This was on August 31, 1950, 
when it entered its order declaring said children depend-
ent and n<>gl<>ded and provided that, subject to the con-
tinuing jurisdi<·tion of the court, the children were to be 
eomtnitted to the Utah State Department of Public Wel-
fare for foster home care, treatment and supervision (Tr . 
. ->+, :2-l(i). At the time the original petition for adoption 
wa~ filed with the District Court and at the time of the 
hearing of thi:-; matter and the entry of the findings, 
conclusions and decree from which this appeal is taken, 
this decree or order of the Juvenile Court had not been 
modified, changed or vacated. The Juvenile Court, under 
:-.uch facts, had exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody 
and control of said minor children. 
Our statute covering jurisdiction of juvenile courts 
provides, in part, as follows: 
"55-10-5. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts.-
The juvenile court shall have ex;clusive original 
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, 
dependency and delinquency of children who are 
under eighteen years of age, * * * . 
(3) When jurisdiction shall have been 
acquired by the court in the case of any child, 
such child shall continue for the purposes of such 
case under the jurisdiction of the court until he 
becomes twenty-one years of age, unless dis-
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charged prior thereto or unless he is cmnmitted 
to the ~tatP industrial school or to the district 
court as hereinafter provided." 
Section 55-10-31, Ctal1 Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides for the nwdification of decrees and is as follows: 
""55-10-31. .Modification during minority-In-
operative after n1ajority.-No judgment or decree 
of the juvenile court shall operate after the child 
becomes twent~--one years of age and all orders, 
judgn1ents and decrees, except commitments to 
the district court or to the state industrial school, 
may be modified or revoked by the court at any 
time before the child becomes twenty-one years 
of age." 
Sectiou 55-10-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sets 
forth the proceedings to be followed for the return of 
custody of the children to their parents and states, in 
part, as follows: 
''55-10-41. Proceedings to return custody to 
parents.-A parent, guardian or next friend of a 
child who has been committed to any children's 
aid society or institution * * * may at any time 
file with the clerk of the juvenile court a petition 
* * * asking for the return of such child to its 
parents or guardian, for the reason that they have 
reformed or the conditions have changed and that 
they are fit and proper persons to have its custody 
and are able to support and educate it." 
Section 55-10-:"S, Ftah Code Annotated 1953, has been 
interpreted and held h~- this court to mean that the J uve-
nile Court, having taken jurisdiction properly, has 
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exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody and control of 
the <·hildren and continues to have such until changed 
~~~· appeal or by its own order. Jensen v. Se1;y, 103 Utah 
~:..m, 1:~-t Pa<'. 2d 1081. ln this case all of the judges, with 
the exc~eption of Larson and l\1offat, specifically so hold . 
. Justice \Yolfe, in his concurring opinion, states: 
.. rrhe opinion of Judge Hoyt expresses my 
opinion on the reason and interpretation of the 
adion of the District Court in refusing to take 
jurisdiction of the question raised by the writ of 
hahea:- l'orpus and the intention of the District 
Court in dismissing the writ. It also expresses my 
opinion that where the Juvenile Court has 
obtained jurisdiction of a child because of neglect, 
dependency or delinquency, the District Court 
must di~mi~:-; the writ. It is not discretionary. The 
order~ of the Juvenile Court are appealed to this 
court under Sec. 1-!-7 -33, ll tah Code Ann. 1943, 
and the judgment of the Juvenile Court cannot be 
overturned by suing out a writ and obtaining a 
hearing on the yery same issue by that method 
either in the District or the Supreme Court." 
Judge Hoyt states: 
"l think it reasonably clear that what the 
court did was to hear the habeas corpus matter 
and finding that the child involved had been 
tak~n into the custody o~ the Juvenile Court, be-
cause of neglect or misconduct of the father 
(petitioner) and that the juvenile court had 
retained jurisdiction of the matter, the district 
court concluded, and I think rightly, that it had 
no jurisdiction to take the child from the custody 
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of the juvenile court or to determine the question 
of the father's fitne~~ to haYe his child returned 
to hin1.'' 
.. In n1y opinion it was not a matter of dis-
cretion. I think the legislature intended to confer 
exclusin' original jurisdiction upon the juvenile 
court to detennine such questions in every case 
wherein the state had becorne a party by the juve-
nile court taking custody of a child because of 
neglect or delinquency. The provisions of sub-
section-! of section 1-!-7-4 R.S. relating to powers 
of courts to determine questions of custody in 
habeas corpus proceedings should not, in my 
opinion, be construed to apply to cases in which 
the state has become a party by intervention of 
the juvenile court. Unless we so construe it we 
cannot reasonably give effect to the provision of 
subsection 3 of section 14-7-4 that 'When juris-
diction shall have been acquired by the court in 
the case of any child, such child shall continue for 
the purposes of such case under the jurisdiction 
of the court until he becomes twenty-one years of 
age, unless discharged prior thereto or unless he 
is committed to the state industrial school or to 
the district court as hereinafter provided.'" 
The case of Chatu·in v. Terry, 107 Utah 340, 153 Pac. 2d 
941, affirms this decision. 
The State of K_ansas has gone even further and held 
that where the District Court obtained original juris-
diction in a divorce case of the custody of children that 
thereafter, \vhen the Juvenile Court determined that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
child was a dependent and neglected child, the Juvenile 
( 
1ourt oui:ited the District Court of the existing jurisdic-
tion. '/'reut v. /ldlwny, (Kan.) 190 Pac. 2d 400: 
"Jt follows that the juvenile court in this case 
eould a<'quire jurisdiction of the minor child and 
ther<>h~· oust the then existing jurisdiction of the 
distric·t court in the divorce action. However this 
' <'ail only IJ<~ done upon a finding based upon sub-
Htantial evidence that the child was neglected and 
dependent within the statutory definition." 
This ('a~e i~ affirmed by the case of Houser v. Houser, 
( J(an.) 199 Pac. 2d 497. 
In the ea~e of Ross l·. Ross, (Colo.) 5 Pac. 2d 246, 
the court held as follows: 
"The jurisdiction of the divorce court is exer-
cised as between the husband and the wife; that of 
the juvenile court 'as between the state, or, so to 
speak, the child, and the parents of the child.' 
State Y. :\IcCloskey, 136 La. 739, 67 So. 813, 814. 
The h\·o courts may have simultaneous, though 
not concurrent, jurisdiction concerning the cus-
tody of the child. Id. But, where both courts have 
made orders concerning such custody, the opera-
tion of the order of the divorce court is suspended 
during the period, and only during the period, 
that the order of the juvenile court remains in 
force." 
B. The Natural Parents Had Not Been Permanently 
Deprived Of The Custody Of The Minor Children. 
The question arises as to what is the meaning of 
the words "judicially deprived of the custody of the 
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child on account of enwlty, neglect or desertion.'' There 
ran be but one meaning to these words and that is that 
the parent ha~ been pennanently and absolutely deprived 
of the custody of the child. The decree of the Juvenile 
Court clearly indicates that this is not the case as it 
provides for continuing jurisdiction and that the father 
of the children shall furnish support therefor. The 
statutes covering Juvenile Courts likewise indicate that 
proceedings of the nature of the one presented here do 
not conten1plate the pern1anent or absolute divesting of 
the custody of a n1inor child from its parents. Section 
:35-10-5 (3), Utalz Code Annotated 1953, provides that 
the jurisdiction of the court shall continue until the child 
becomes twenty-one years of age, unless discharged prior 
thereto or committed to the state industrial school or to 
the district court. 55-10-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is the section covering the preferred rights of parents to 
custody of children and 55-10-41, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, is the section covering the procedure to return the 
custody of children to their parents, based upon the 
ground that the parents have reformed or that condi-
tions have changed and that they are fit and proper 
persons to have its custody and are able to support and 
educate the child. 
The Juvenile Court, by ordering that the father of 
the children pay $100.00 per month for their support 
and maintenance, clearly indicated that it did not intend 
to permanently deprive the parents of custody of said 
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ehildren. I ,ayJnPnt~ were made by appellant for their 
support (Tr. S~>). 
In a goo<l tnan~· of the statutes of other states there 
is a pro\·i~ion, in addition to the one in our statutes, that 
pro\' i<l<·:-; t II at it :-;]Ja11 not be n<~eessary to obtain a con-
:-;Pllt from the father or mother deprived of civil rights 
or adjudged guilty of adultery or eruelty and for such 
<·au:-;p cliYorced and deprived of the custody of the child, 
and hy the great weight of authority the courts of these 
different :-;tate:-; have held that sueh a provision does not 
do away with the giving of the consent of the parents 
nnle:-;:-; the parent has been absolutely deprived of the 
('U:-:tody. 
Ollsn((l r. Lelmzan, (X. ~lex.) 2-!-3 Pac. 2d 600. In 
thi:-; case the lower court approved a petition to adopt 
two minor children without the consent of their natural 
father, where the mother had procured a divorce from 
such father on the ground of cruelty and she had been 
awarded eu~tocly of such children, with the father being 
granted the right of visitation at reasonable times. The 
~ ew ~Iexico statute "~as as follows: 
"Section 25-207, N. l\I. S. A., 1941 Comp., 
reads: 
(A lPgitimate child cannot be adopted withou.t 
tlze consent of its parents, if living together; and 
if legally separated, the consent of the parent 
having legal custody of the child must be obtained. 
It shall not be necessary to obta.in the consent from 
a father or mother depri'&'ed of civil rights or ad-
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judged guilty of adultery or crnelty, aud for such 
calu,'c dil.·orced aud deprircd of the custody of 
flu> child, or adjudged to be an habitual drunkard, 
or who has been judicially deprived of the custody 
of the child on accotmt of eruelty to, abandonment 
and negled_ of. the child or of infamous conduct.' 
( En1phasis supplied.)" 
The Appellate court, in reversing the lower court, held 
as follows: 
"The italicized portion of the statute quoted 
above seems to be a common one in many states. 
One of the leading cases on the subject is In re 
Jackson, 55 Nev. 17-1, 28 P. 2d 125, 129, 91 A. L. R. 
1381. The statute and facts in that case are 
alnwst identical with the statute and facts we 
have here. It is there stated: 
'* * * we are of the opinion that where a 
divorce is granted for cruelty and the innocent 
spouse is awarded the custody of the children (as 
in this case), consent of the guilty spouse can 
only be dispensed with in a proceeding for adop-
tion of such children when the custody is awarded 
to the innocent party without reserving any rights 
whatever in the guilty spouse. The custody must 
be absolute. To conclude otherwise would be to 
attribute to the Legislature a very slight regard 
for the great domestic relation of parent and 
child. As previously stated, consent lies at the 
foundation of adoption statutes. It is so with 
our statute. The order of adoption in this case 
was void because made without the consent of 
respondent.' 
There, as here, the guilty spouse had been 
given the right to visit the child at reasonable 
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times. The case in A. L. R., supra, is followed by 
an annotation beginning at page 1387. 
The following cases hold under a similar 
statut<> where the custody of the child is given to 
the innocent spouse with right of visitation to the 
offending spouse, the consent of the offending 
spouse is a pn~n,qui:..;ite to a valid adoption: In 
n• ( 'ozza, 1 t;:) C'al. :> 1-l-, 126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 
191-l-A, ~1-l-; Bell v. Krauss, 169 Cal. 387, 146 
P. S7-l-: ~Iiller v. Higgins, 14 Cal. App. 156,111 P. 
-to:~; In re De Leon, 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 P. 738; 
fn reLease, 99 Wash. -l-13, 169 P. 816; In re Force 
113 \Y ash. 151, 193 P. 698; In re Walker, 170 
\\~ a~h. -l-;)-1-, 17 P. :!d 15; Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 
34-9, 180 P. 2d 853 and Stone v. Dickerson, Tex. 
Civ. App., 138 ~. "\Y. 2d 200.'' 
In the case of Jackson 'C. Spellman, (Nev.) 28 Pac. 
:2cl 125, 91 A. L. R. 1381, the court, in passing upon this 
:..;ame question, cites with approval from California, which 
court held as follows: 
"'\Yhat is meant by this section, and what 
was intended by the Legislature, it having in mind 
the natural rights of parents, as also the authority 
of courts in divorce proceedings to award the 
custody of children to either spouse, was that 
when a divorce is granted for cruelty (we are only 
concerned with this ground here), and the cus-
tody of the children is awarded absolutely to the 
innocent party, the consent of the guilty one will 
not be required in adoption proceedings. It con-
templates that by decree of court in such pro-
ceedings the court has deprived the guilty spouse 
of all right to such custody, and awarded it abso-
lutely to the innocent party. That this is the 
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proper interpretation of the section we think rea-
sonably appear.s fron1 the language used in the 
section in this sa1ne connection as to consent and 
with reference to other proceedings than in 
divorce, where it is provided that, when the parent 
has been "judicially deprived' of the custody of 
the children on account of cruelty or neglect, the 
consent of such parent is not necessary. The 
Legislature, in providing a 1nethod for adoption, 
whereby the legal ties between the parent and the 
child should be absolutely severed, could not have 
intended to interfere with the authority of the 
court in other proceedings involving the custody 
of the child, or that the decree of a court in a 
divorce proceeding which awarded such custody 
to the guilty spouse should be entirely ignored.' 
It will be seen that the court in the above case 
declined to construe the statute literally and held 
that it did not apply except in a case where the 
custody of the children had been given absolutely 
to the innocent spouse." 
.. ~I ore precisely, we are of the opinion that 
where a divorce is granted for cruelty and the 
innocent spouse is awarded the custody of the 
children (as in this case), consent of the guilty 
spouse can only be dispensed with in a proceeding 
for adoption of such children when the custody 
is awarded to the innocent party without reserv-
ing any rights whatever in the guilty spouse. The 
custody must be absolute. To conclude otherwise: 
would be to attribute to the Legislature a very 
slight regard for the great domestic relation of 
parent and child. As previously stated, consent 
lies at the foundation of adoption statutes. It is 
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so with our statute. rrhe order of adoption in this 
<'ase was void because made without the consent 
of re~pondent." 
In the <·a~e of Bonck v. Bonck, (Old.) 218 Pac. 2d 
902, the <·ourt states: 
"'rhe theor~' advanced in support of the first 
ground is that the decree of adoption, having been 
<'II t Pred by a court of competent jurisdiction and 
heing regular on it:-; face, was not open to col-
lateral attack. The theory could be sound only 
if the decree of adoption were a judicial act. That 
~u('h is not the case we expressly held in Re 
Huglw~, SS Okl. :2~)7, 213 P. 79, when, in the syl-
labu~, we ~tated: 'The adoption of a child is 
e.-:~entially a matter of confract between the par-
tiP:-; whose consent is required and is not a judi-
cial proceeding, although the sanction of a judical 
officer is required for its consummation.'" 
"The statute recognizes that the consent of 
both parents, even though divorced, is necessary 
to an adoption, unless the divorce was granted 
upon the ground of cruelty of ·which the offending 
parent had been adjudged guilty. It follows that 
it is not the divorcement but the adjudication of 
cruelty that is 1nade the basis of rendering the 
consent unnecessary. It is the unfitness of the one 
so adjudged guilt~T and the absence, by reason 
thereof, of that parental fitness necessary in 
determining the child's welfare that his or her 
consent is not required along with that of the 
unoffending parent. It does not follow, however, 
that the fact of unfitness so found is one that 
necessarily continues or that the court is pre-
cluded by such adjudication from inquiring 
therein further where it is in the interest of the 
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child to do ~o. And where, upon such further 
inquiry, the court finds that the offending parent 
is fit to haYe the care and eustod~, of such child 
and nmkes an award of total or partial custody, 
the effect thereof should be to destroy the 
force of the fonner adjudication on and after 
such finding and a ward, and we hold such to be 
the case. \Yith such restoration of the mother to 
parental right and competency her consent became 
neef's;:.;ar:T to the adoption of the child and since 
such consent was not had in the proceedings relied 
on, the court did not err in holding same of no 
effect." 
C. Written Consent For Adoption Is Required From 
The Natural Mother Or, If Not, From The Juvenile 
Court Or Children's Aid Society. 
rnless the natural nwther had been permanently 
deprived of the custory of her ehildren her written con-
sent was required before a valid adoption could be nmde. 
Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Amzotated 1953, provides that 
a legitimate child cannot be adopted without consent of 
its parents, if living, except the consent is not necessary 
frmn.a father or 1nother who has been judicially deprived 
of the custody of a child on account of eruelty, neglect 
or desertion. 
rrhe general rule throughout the majority of states is 
that an adoption is in derogation of the common law and 
the adoptive statutes should receive strict construction 
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and P\'Pr)· intendment should be in favor of the claim of 
the pan·nt. J,V('.•;/erltttul u. Croaff, (Ariz.) 198 Pac. 2d 
S-t.~: 
"·A:-; adoption is in derogation of the common 
law, g<'n<'rally speaking it may be said that adop-
t i \'(~ :-;tat ut<~:-; should receive a strict construction, 
particularly \\'ith respect to the jurisdiction of the 
court or \\'lt<·n· the effect of the adoption would 
he to deprive a natural parent of the possession 
of his child. • • • 
·~\ltltough tlH· courts tend to construe adop-
tion ~tatute~ to favor the child, it is also true, due 
to the resped paid the relationship of parent and 
child, that every intendment should be in favor 
of the claim of the parent, and where the statute 
is open to construction and interpretation, it 
should be construed in support of a natural parent 
who does not consent to the adoption.' 2 C. J. S., 
Adoption of Children, Sec. 6a. 
See also In re \Yehh's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 
177 P. :2d :2:2:2; Furgeson Y. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20 
P. 8-t.:2, 3 L. R. A. 620, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808; In re 
X ewman, SS Cal. ~-\pp. 186, 262 P. 1'112; :Matter 
of Cozza. 163 Cal. 31-t., 126 P. 161, Ann. Cas. 
191-t.~\, :21-t: In re Jackson, 33 NeY. 17-t, 28 P. 2d 
1 :2:>, 91 A. L. R. 1381: 1 Cal. J ul'. 436, Sec. 19.'' 
Smith r. Smith, (Ida.) 180 Pac. 2d 853: 
''Adoption statutes open to construction and 
interpretation should be strictly construed and 
every intendment taken in favor of the natural 
parent not consenting to adoption. As was held 
In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 17 4, 28 P. 2d 1'25, 129, 91 
A. L. R. 1381: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lil 
"' [ .. · 
23 
'Tlw eu~todY n1ust be absolute. 11o conclude 
otherwise would. be to attribute to tlw Legislature 
a Yery slight regard for the great domestic rela-
tion of parent and child. A~ previously stated, 
consent lies at the foundation of adoption 
statutes: ~, 
Jackson l'. Spellman, (Xe\·.) :2~ Pac. :2d. 125, 91 A. 
L. R. 1381: 
"The foregoing cases are illustrative of the 
strict con~truction which courts place upon the 
provisions in adoption statutes which dispense 
with the consent of a child's parents. The consent 
of the natural parents lies at the foundation of 
~tatutes of adoption. 1 Cal. Juris. p. 436. It ought 
not to be dispensed with in response to the mere 
letter of a statute, but only when its letter and 
~pirit conjoin in showing that such was the plain 
intention of the Legislature. 
Every intendment should be in favor of the 
clain1 of the parent and where the statute is open 
to construction and interpretation it should be 
construed in support of a naturai parent. In re 
Coz;za, supra; 1 Cal. .Juris. p. -t-:37." 
The District Court would not have jurisdiction of 
an adoption proceeding unless the consent of the parents 
is given, or is not necessary, and the burden of proof is 
on the part:· seeking to justify the adoption on the ground 
that consent is not necessary. In re Adoption of Stra,u~ 
ser, ( \\~:·o.) 196 Pac. ~d 862. At page 867 the court 
state~: 
"Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of 
adoption. In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161, 
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.\nn. Ca~. 1914A, 214-; In re Lem;e, 99 Wash. 413, 
1G9 P. su;. Our :;tatutes are esjH~eially clear on 
that point. Jn the routine case, the parties con-
~Pnt or agTPe, and the final act of the court or 
judg<> i~ called the 'approval of such agreement 
and adoption' ( ~P<·. ;)~-~01), or refusal 'to approve 
~u<'h adoption' (~<'<~. ;),~-:Wi".l). The first duty of 
tll<' judg<~ is to see that the necessary consents 
ar<' gi\'<>n. Ir they are not, the proceeding is at an 
<·nd. TIH're is nothing for the judge to approve. 
Tl)(•re i~ :-:<'ldom any doubt as to the consent of the 
pPr~ons who offer to adopt the children, and the 
children often, as in the present case, are too 
young to be commlted. The important require-
ment i:-; the consent of parents ·who have not 
abandoned the children. They speak not only for 
themselves hut also for the children of whom they 
are the natural guardians. 
\Vhen a parent refuses to consent, and the 
matter in controver;-.:y is whether he had aban-
doned the child so as to dispense ·with the neces-
~ity of his consent, the burden of proof is on the 
part~· seeking to justify the adoption on that 
ground, and the courts often say that the evidence 
to show abandonment must be clear and convinc-
ing. See In re Bistany, 209 App. Div. 286, 204 N. 
Y. S. 599; In re I{elly, 25 Cal. App. 651, 145 P. 
1 :lG; Petition of Rice, 179 '\Vis. 531, 192 N. W. 56; 
..:\Iastrovich v . ..:\f avric, 66 S. D. 577, 287 N. '\V. 97. 
It is important to observe the difference be-
tween a proceeding in which the court makes a 
provisional and temporary order for the custody 
of an infant, and an adoption proceeding in which 
the final order of approval will absolutely and 
permanent!~· sever the natural relation between 
parent and child. In a custody case the welfare 
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of the child under the then existing conditions 
1nay be controlling. See Harris Y. ~luir, :2-l: \Vyo. 
:213, 1;)1 P. :2(i; I~ennison v. Chokie, 55 \Vyo. -l-:21, 
100 r. :2d. ~ll. In an adoption proceeding in whi('h 
it is neee:-;~ary for the petitioners to prove that a 
parent has abandoned the child, questions in 
l't\l2,·a nl to the fitnes~ of the petitioners (Sees. 58-
:201, ;)~-:20;)) and the welfare of the child (Sec. 
;)~-:20D) nre not reached if ahandonn1ent is not 
proyed. In re Cozza, supra: In re Lease, supra; 
~[atter of Bistany, :239 X. Y. 19, 1-l-:l ~. E. 70; 
Connelly Y. Jones, 165 JUl. 544, 110 A. 11-1-; In re 
~\nderson, 189 :Minn. 85, :2-l-8 N". \Y. 657; Platt v. 
j[oore, Tex. Civ. App., V~:1 S. \Y. :2d 682." 
Tr esterlund r. Croaff, supra: 
·· \Ye shall first consider the jurisdiction ques-
tion which is squarely presented by this record. 
Is the consent in writing of the living natural 
parents, or the statutory equivalent of such con-
sent, an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to the 
exercise of the pmYer of the court in an adoption 
proceeding~ Certain well established principles 
will be of aid in answering this question: 
'As adoption is in derogation of the cmnmon 
law, generally speaking it may he said that adopt-
ive statutes should receive a strict construction, 
particular!~~ with respect to the jurisdiction of the 
court or where the effect of the adoption would 
be to deprive a natural parent of the possession 
of his child. * * * 
'Although the courts tend to construe adop-
tion ~tatutes to favor the child, it is also true, due 
to the respect paid the relationship of parent and 
child, that every intend1nent should be in favor 
of the clai1n of the parent, and where the statute 
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is open to construction and interpretation, it 
:-:llould he <·on:-:t nw<l in support of a natural parent 
who does not <·on:-:<>nt to the adoption.' 2 C .• J. S., 
.Adoption of < ~hildren, f;ec. 6a. 
~<'e also Jn n• \\'ebb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 
171 P. :2d :2:2:2; Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20 
P. ~-+:2, :~ L. H. A. ():20, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808; In re 
Newman, SS Cal. A pp. 186, 262 P. 1112; Matter of 
Cozza, 1 ():~ Cal. ;, 1-t, 1 ~() P. 1G1, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 
~1-t-; Jn re J:wb:on, :)5 Ke\·. 174, 2~ P. 2d 125, 91 
A. L. R. 1 :~s 1 ; 1 Cal. J ur. 436, Sec. 19." 
.. The language of the statute being plain and 
unambiguous, we hold that under our law consent 
in writing of the living natural parents, or its 
~tatutory ettuivalent, is a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to a valid adoption. This principle is stated 
in ~ C. J. ~., Adoption of Children, Sec. 18: 
'l'on~ent of the parties to an adoption, where 
required by the statute, is a jurisdictional fact and 
"·ithout it a valid order of adoption cannot be 
made * *'' ~, •• ~eP also ~ee. 21-a ( 1) Ibid. 
The court in the instant case, there being a 
lack of eon~ent, by express!~· finding an absence of 
the only alleged statutory equivalent, automatic-
ally deprived itself of the right to proceed further 
with the hearing. Jurisdiction cannot be made to 
hinge upon a finding as to the 'best interests' of 
the child. It would be an idle thing for the trial 
court to proceed to take further testi1nony in the 
case on this latter point where the jurisdiction to 
grant the adoption no longer existed. Renck v. 
Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 320, 
187 P. 2d 656." 
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In thi~ ea~e the adopting parents certainly have not 
carried the burden of proof to show that the nwther was 
permanently judicially deprived of the custody of her 
minor children. The only evidence offered in this con-
nection is the decree of the Juvenile Court which has the 
continuing jurisdiction provision contained therein, and 
to refute the question that this wa8 to permanently 
deprive her of the custody there are the letters written 
by Judge F. ~1. Alder, introduced in evidence by appel-
lant as Exhibits "l'' and ":2'', which clearly demonstrate 
that the Juvenile Court did not intend to permanently 
deprive the rnother of custody of said children. In the 
letter of February 10, 1951 ~lr. Alder rnade the following 
statement: "Of course, your future prospects and con-
duct will detennine the results as to the children." (Tr. 
:2-±-±), while in the letter of :Jiay 11, 1951, which he signed 
as Judge of the Juvenile Court, he made the following 
statements: 
"As to your children, don't worry about them 
because the gossip about adoption by July can-
not be anything but gossip and you do not need 
to worry about that as there is no tirne, within a 
reasonable time, that such procedure ever occurs. 
The best advice I can give ~'OU at the present 
time is that you try to rnake your present mar-
riage a success and let the future take care of 
itself as it comes along. Your children are in 
good hands so that you need not worry about their 
heing cared for." ( Tr. 243). 
The evidence also indicates that ~irs. Brown was. 
pennitted to see the children on at least one occasion 
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and wa:-; advi:-;<>d not to visit them on other occasions 
IH·<·au:-;e it would IH· detrimental to the (·hildren (rrr. 78). 
But li<'V('l' was she informed by the Juvenile Court or 
h~· <lll~' of th(' well'are workers that she had been deprived 
ol' tlw right of her children permanently and that she 
could not ag·ain seek cu:-;tody of the children. In fact, 
:-;IH~ paid for their :-;upport pursuant to the .Juvenile Court 
decree ( rrr. s:-)). 
If the court ean, b~· any justification, hold that the 
consent of thP natural mother was not necessary, the 
Distric-t Court ~till did not have jurisdiction to grant 
the adoption without obtaining the consent and approval 
of the Juvenile Court. 8 ection 5:5-10-40, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1D:3.'J, provides that upon order of the Juvenile 
Court a child may he committed to a children's aid society 
or institution, that such society shall he considered the 
guardian and that such society and institution, under the 
direction of the court and subject to its approval, may 
provide suitable homes for such children. Section 55-10-
43, Ctah Code Annotated 1953, then provides that in the 
event such society or institution secures a suitable home 
for the legal adoption of children committed to its care 
it shall report such to the court and the court, after an 
examination, shall authorize such society or institution 
to :-;Penre for such children legal adoption. 
\Y. e are of the opinion that the Utah State Depart-
Inent of Public Welfare is not a children's aid society 
with this power to place children for adoption under our 
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~tatntt' il8 under Section .>:>-10-6', Utah Code A11notnted 
19.>3, a children's ai4 society "shall mean any duly 
organized ~oeiet~~ incorporated under the laws of this 
::;tate and having- anwng- its objects the protection of 
children frmn cruelty, and the care and control of delin-
quent, neglected and dependent children. The articles of 
incorporation of eyery such ~ociet:~ n1ust specifically pro-
Yide that any abuse of the rights granted under the pro-
visions of this chapter shall subject such corporation to 
an action hy the attorney-general, under the provisions 
of chapter 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure." However, 
if the Utah ~tate Departn1ent of Public \Velfare can be 
~o classified, in order to perfect an adoption it required 
the approval of the Juvenile Court, which was not ob-
tained in the case of either of the children under discus-
~ion, and therefore the District Court under no circum-
Etances had jurisdiction to even pass upon the question 
as to whether it was for the best interests of the children 
to be adopted and to enter its decrees of adoption. 
II. THE WELFARE OF A CHILD IS NOT THE 
PARAMOUNT ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE COURT 
HAS JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO PERMIT AN 
ADOPTION. 
The District Court in these matters clearly indicates 
hy its findings of fact and conclusions of law in each 
case that it was upon its finding that it would be to the 
best interests of the children that they be adopted and 
that the natural 1nother be deprived of her own children 
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that it Pnt<·n•d iti-i decree~ of adoption. This is pointed 
out in finding-H 10 and 11 and conclusion 2, which are as 
follow~: 
"1 0. 'l,hat the health of said minor child 
would be endang-ered, pll:·:..;icall.Y and mentally, by 
a11:· <·ilangt> of <'u~tody and that it would be a 
p~:·<·ilologi<'al risk and detrimental to the physical, 
elllotional and moral health and stability of the 
~aid minor child to return her to her natural 
mother, who had since remarried and who with 
her pn·~<·nt husband i:-: not now known to said 
minor child." ( Tr. 19). 
"11. That the physical, emotional and moral 
health and stability of said minor child, her 
~ecnrity and be:-:t intere~t~, will best be promoted 
by such adoption prayed for in the petition here-
in." (Tr. 19) . 
... > That it would be to the best interests of 
:-;aid minor child that a decree be entered in favor 
of :-;aid petitioners, * * *, for the adoption of said 
child." (Tr. 19). 
X o where in the finding:-: or conclusions or decree is 
it determined that the natural mother of these children 
wa:-; not a fit and proper person to have the care, custody 
and control of said children. The law is well established 
that the natural parents have a paramount right to their 
children if they are fit and proper persons to·have such 
custody. In the case of H mres L'. Cohen) (Cal.) 255 Pac. 
2d 761, the court held: 
"It has been held repeatedly that, while the 
best interests of an illegitimate child is the impor-
tant factor, the parents of such a child have a 
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~uperior claint as against the world to his custody 
if the:- a rp fit and proper. Armstrong v. Price, 
~Io. .\ pp., :2~l:2 ~. \V. -l--l-7, mother; Jensen v. 
Earlp:-, G3 rtah 60-l-, :2:2~ P. :217, mother; In re 
n ille, supra, t):'l Cal. App. G17, :2:2-l- P. 7~-l-, nwther; 
E:\: parte \\~allace, :2() X. ~1. 1~1. 190 P. 1020, 
father; Garrett v. ~Iahaley, 199 ~~\ln. 606, 75 So. 
10, father; Le\Yis Y. Crowell, :210 Ala. 199, 97 So. 
G91, father; People ex rel. ~len•dith v. l\[eredith, 
supra, :2j:2 .:\pp. Div. j~), 69 N. Y. ~. 2d 462, 
affirmed :2~)7 X. Y. (i9:2, 17 X. E. 2d 8; State v. 
XP~taYnl, 1:2 :Jiinn. -!15, 7:1 X. \Y. 7:23; Jackson v. 
Luckie, :205 Ga. 100, 3:2 ~- E. :2d :1SS; Ex parte 
~ch\\-artzkopf, 1-!9 X eb. -!60, 31 N. W. 2d 29-!; Ex 
parte :Malley, 131 X. J. Eq. -!0-!, 25 A. :2d 630; 
French v. Catholic Com1nunity League, 69 Ohio 
.\pp. J.--!-:2, -!-! N. E. :2d 113; Cmn. ex rei. Hyman v. 
Hyman, 1G~b Pa. Super. 6-!, 63 A. 2d 4-l-7; Temple-
ton v. \Valker, Tex. Civ. App., 179 S. \V. 2d 811; 
Henderson v. Henderson, 187 V a. 121, 46 S. E. 2d 
10: Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N. 
E. :2d 89; 7 Am. Jur., Bastards, Sees. 61-66; 10 
C. J. S., Bastards, Sec. 17; Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 
\Y. Va. -l-10, 137 S. E. 651, 51 A. L. R. 1507. The 
::'Ullll' rule has been applied ·with respect to the 
custody of legiti1nate children. Civ. Code, Sec. 
197; Roche ,, .... Roche, 25 Cal. :2rl 141, 152 P. 2d 
999; Stever v. Stever, 6 Cal. 2d 166, 56 P. 2d 1229; 
ea~es cited 13 Cal. J ur. 153-5." 
"Hence extreme caution must be observed in 
depriving a parent of the custody of his child. 
If he is fit, the child should not be taken from him 
by vague applications of the concept that the best 
interests of the child come first. Otherwise there 
is no lin1it to the extent courts ma:- go. They may 
base parental deprivation of custody on what they 
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<·on:-;id<·r hett<> r financial or social standing, edu-
<·a t ional background, nationality, race, or religion, 
<'i<'., although the fitnP~~ of the parent is apparent. 
l\lend.Y }J(•c·au:-;<~ some other person may he more 
fit should not he a ha~i~ for defeating the parent's 
natural right. If without finding the parent unfit 
t liP gPn<'ral conclusion is reached that the best 
int<·rP~t~ of the <·hild require that a stranger be 
his c·11~todian, the necessary hypothesis is that 
although the parent was fit, the court decided 
someone PI~<· was more fit. That means that the 
stat<· acting through its courts may completely 
eliminate all parental rights. The next step would 
be for the state to assume complete and arbitrary 
power over children (·ontran· to the principles 
<>nunciated in the Lerner, Prince and ~Ieyer cases, 
supra. Our conclusion does not mean that the 
child is a chattel belonging to the parent nor that 
the state does not have a vital concern in the wel-
fare of the child and the right to make regulations 
in that field. Rather it gives protection to the 
parent's right of custody which is founded upon 
the importance of the family relationship in this 
eountry." 
In re Sclnnd/s Adojdion, (Pa.) 50 Atl. 2d 504: 
.. Judge ICeller said, at page 308 of 113 Pa. 
Super., at page 749 of 173 A.: 'Unless the requisite 
consents declared by the act of assembly to be 
necessary are obtained, or there is a specific find-
ing that both the father and the mother of the 
children have abandoned them, a decree of adop-
tion cannot be entered. The welfare of the chil-
dren is not sufficient ground for the decree of 
adoption, unless based on the necessary consent of 
the parents, or on the distinct finding that the 
parent or parents not consenting have abandoned 
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the children. Tlw fad that the adoption asked 
for may he adYan tagPon~ to the children and for 
their umterial welfare i~ not to be considered by 
the court until the 11eee~~a r:· prerequisites for 
such action exist.' 
\Ye are therefore required to reverse the de-
cree here appealed frmn, but expressly withhold 
any decision as to the custody of the child, a lnat-
ter not now before ns." 
In re .Adoption of D ______ .... ____ , (Ftah) :!5:! Pac. 2d 223: 
"Third: The \velfare of the child. That par-
enb ha,-e the pri1nary and ~nperior right to the 
custody of their offspring above all others is not 
open to question; nor is it suggested that anyone 
may take a child away fron1 a natural parent 
1nerely because he can offer the child better ad-
vantages than the natural parent could provide. 
X evertheless, when questions of child custody 
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for 
a suitable hon1e environment and advantages in 
nurture, training and education to the end that she 
may live and be conditioned for a well adjusted, 
happy and useful life are i1nportant factors to con-
sider. In fact, it is often stated that such consid-
erations are of the parmnount importance. How-
ever, this is modified by the presumption that the 
welfare of the child will best be subserved by being 
in the custody of its natural parent." 
In rc Adoption of Walton, (Utah) 259 Pac. 2d 881: 
"Courts have not hesitated to build a strong 
fortress around the parent-child relation, and 
have stocked it with ammunition in the form of 
established rules that adds to its in1pregnability. 
To sever the relationship successfully, one must 
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have abandoned the <·hild, and such abandonment 
mu~t he with a :-;pe<'ifie intent so to do,-an intent 
to :-;<•ver all eorrelative rights and duties incident 
to tlH· relationship. ~ueh intent must be proved 
I>~· him who ass<'rts it, by proof that not only pre-
pond<·rat<'s, hut which must be clear and satis-
l'ador~·,-~·;omething akin to that degree of proof 
JH'<'Ps~ar~· to establish an offense beyond a reason-
able doubt, or, as one authority puts it 'by clear 
and indubitable evidence.' The relationship has 
been considered a bundle of human rights of such 
fundamental importance as to lead courts fre-
quent!~· to ~a~· that consent is at the foundation 
of adoption statutes, that evidence pertaining to 
it lllnst he appraised in a light most favorable to 
him whose parental right is assaulted, that adop-
tion statutes being in derogation of the common 
law are to be construed strictly in favor of the 
parent and the preservation of the relationship, 
(although not the rule in rtah) and that all 
doubts are resolved against its destruction. The 
authorities haYe gone so far in their protection of 
these kinship rights as to hold that an abandon-
ment, eYen though a fait accompli, can be the sub-
ject of repentance, absent vested rights in others. 
Oft times it is pointed out that abandonment, 
within the meaning of adoption statutes, must be 
conduct evincing 'a settled purpose to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims 
to the child.' In defense of the relationship are 
authorities which refuse to accept 'abandonment' 
as synonymous with 'non-support' under adoption 
statutes, although non-support may be an import-
ant factor in establishing an abandon1nent. So 
jealously guarded is the parent-child relation that 
uniformly it is held that the abandonment or de-
sertion firmly must be established by the type 
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of proof \H:' 1nention, before any question as to 
the best interests or welfare of the child can be 
the subject of inquiry. The ilnportance of preserv-
ing the relationship clearly is pointed up when one 
considers the well-established concept that cus-
tody 1nay be awarded in a proper case, while the 
courts 1nay have no power to sever the relation-
~hip.-accounting for the principle that the wel-
fare of the child is of great in1portance in custody 
<·ase~, but quite inunaterial in adoption cases un-
til an effective abandonment of parental rights 
i~ shown. \Yere the rule otherwise, and an indis-
rriminate sanction of the dispossession of parental 
rights without consent were atte1npted, serious 
constitutional impedimenta no doubt would loom 
large under the due process clause." 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF 
THE JUVENILE COURT DAT'ED FEBRUARY 13, 1953. 
There \Yas offered in evidence the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree and judg1nent of the J uve-
nile Court, ·which involved a hearing to determine whether 
the two older children, nan1ely: Larry Deveraux and 
Blaine Deveraux, should be returned to the custody of 
their mother or their mother and father. In the findings, 
conclusions and decree the court found, concluded and 
decreed that the n1other, Rhea Walker Brown, fonnerly 
Rhea Walker Deveraux, and the father, Ellis Deveraux, 
had changed their course of conduct sufficiently for the 
better to justify the return of said children to them on 
a trial ha~is. A portion of the findings is as follows: 
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"Tlwt ~I r. Brown is willing to take the said 
children, Larry Deveraux and Blaine Deverau;x., 
into tlJ<• Brown home and care and provide for 
the said dtildren; that the mother, Rhea Brown 
lw:-; changed her courH~ of conduct for the better 
and her present conduct appears to qualify her 
to a:-;:-:uJJJ<• tll<' care and custody of said children, 
• • *.'' (Tr. 118-122). 
The deere<•, in part, ~tates as follows: 
"lrl, IS THEREFORE ADJ[DGED AND 
IH:CHJ<:ED by the Court that the care, control 
and <·u;-;to<l:• of the said children at the ·end of this 
school term, shall be returned to their mother, 
Rhea 'Valker Brown, formerly Rhea Walker Dev-
eraux, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of 
the Court;***.'' (Tr.123-125). 
The Juvenile Court is a court of competent juris-
diction in connection with the care, custody and control 
of the minor children and its findings and decree as to 
the fitness of their mother, unless appealed from, become 
res judicata and binding upon the District Court. The 
findings, conclusions and judgment and decree of the 
Juvenile Court were certainly competent, material and 
relevant evidence in the issues on the adoption proceed-
ings and it was error for the court to refuse their ad-
mission in evidence. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT 
IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN REPORT OF THE 
TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT. 
The court erred in refusing to admit in evidence 
the written report on appellant dated December 11, 1952, 
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from the Tooele County Department of Publie \Velfare 
for the reason that ~aid report was made to the .Juvenile 
Court at the time appellant requested the return of her 
two older children to her. This report contained the fol-
lowing ~tatement: 
.. X o doubt, there was a time in nr n;. Brown's 
life when she "·as not a fit n10ther, and :·ou are 
better acquainted with these facts than I am. 
Xevertheless, I can honestly sa:· that since her 
marriage to :J[r. Brown and during the past year, 
her behavior has been above reproach. She takes 
excellent care of her home and her baby, as can be 
verified by anyone in Stockton. I can find no 
cause to deprive her of the custody of her chil-
dren at tllis time." (Tr. 116). 
This evidence was clearly 1naterial to show that ap-
pellant had changed her way of life and was a fit and 
proper person to have the custody of her 1ninor children. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
A. The Court Erred In Finding That The Juvenile 
Court Permanently Deprived The Natural Parents 
Of Custody Of Said Children. 
The court erred in entering its finding of fact 2, 
which is as follows: 
"·) That on or about the 31st day of August, 
1950, the .Juvenile Court of the Third District, in 
and for 1~tah County, State of Ftah, determined 
that the said natural parents of said child are un-
fit and improper persons to have her care, custody 
and control and signed and entered its Decree and 
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.J udglll<'lli dec·laring and adjudging the ~aid Diane 
I )<'\'<'raux to he a dependent and neglected <'hild 
\\'ithin tlH· weaning of the laws of Utah and per-
lllanen tl ~· dqn·iving the aforesaid natural parents 
of the <·u~tod~· of ~aid child and committed said 
ehild to til<> t:tah ~tatP Department of Public Wel-
l'a n• for l'o~t<·r home care, treatment, and super-
vi~ion." ('rr. 17), 
and particular}~· the portion 'and permanently depriving 
the afore~aid natural pan·nt~ of the custody of said 
child." 
A~ wP have heretofore pointed out under point IB, 
the evidence conclu~ively ~lwws that the Juvenile Court 
did not permanently depriYe the parents of the custody 
of their childrPll, and :-:ince the matter has been fully dis-
<·u:-::-:Pd before we will not make any further comments 
thereon. 
B. The Court Erred In Making Its Findings Of Fact 
10 And 11. 
\Ye contend that findings 10 and 11, which are as 
follows: 
"10. That the health of said minor child 
would be endangered, physically and mentally, 
b~' an~, change of custody and that it would be a 
psychological risk and detrll:nental to the physi-
cal, emotional and moral health and stability of 
the said minor child to return her to her natural 
mother, who has since remarried and who with 
her present husband is not now known to said 
1ninor child." (Tr. 19). 
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"11. That the physieal, emotional and 1noral 
health and stabilitY of ~aid 1ninor ehild, her se-
enrity and best interests, will best be promoted 
by such adoption prayed for in the petition here-
in." ( Tr. 19). 
are not supported by the evidence. This question has 
been disenssed previously under point II. 
The findings completely ignore the presun1ption that 
it will be to the hest interests of a child to be with its 
natural parents if they are fit and proper persons and 
attempt to make the sole issue involved in the adoption 
)~_ proceedings the question of \Yhat would be the best in-
EL terests of the child regardless of parental rights. 
C. The Court Erred In Making Its Conclusions of Law 
1, 2 And 3. 
The conclusions of law 1, 2 and 3 are as follows: 
.. 1. That the decree of the Juvenile Court 
judicially and permanently deprives the natural 
parents of said minor child of the custody of said 
child on account of neglect of said natural par-
ents." (Tr. 19). 
··2. That it would be to the best interests of 
said 1ninor child that a decree be entered in favor 
of said petitioners, * * *, for the adoption of said 
child." (Tr. 19). 
'"3. That the prayer of the petition should be 
granted." (Tr. 20). 
\Ye are of the opinion that the error of making these 
eonelll~ion~ is full~~ covered under points IB and II. 
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D. The Court Erred In Failing To Make A Finding As 
To Whether The Mother Was, Or Was Not, A Fit 
And Proper Person To Have The Custody Of Her 
Children. 
rrhe <'OUI'l :-;}tould have lllade a finding On the fitness 
ol' the lttotil<'r to have the care, custody and control of 
l1Pr children, ot]J<'rwi~<~ it Hhould have excluded all evi-
dt>nce relating to that subject and to the question as to 
the heHt intereHts of the child unless some question had 
been rai~<·d that the child would not properly fit into the 
enYiromnent of the adopting parents or that the adopting 
parents were not fit and proper persons to have the care 
and custody of said children. 
\Ya~ notice of the adoption proceedings given to the 
mother purel~· for the purpose of protesting that the 
adopting parents "·ere not proper or that it would not be 
for the best interests of the children to be adopted by 
such parties t \Yas not notice given so that she might 
present to the court her fitness for the care, custody and 
control of the children, particularly where she has never 
given her consent~ Or if consent of no one was needed, 
we cannot see wh~· notice should then be given. 
CONCLUSION -
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the Dis-
trict Court did not have jurisdiction to pass upon the 
adoption of these children for the reason that no consent 
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"·as eYer giYen in accordance with the law of this state 
or otherwise, and this court should sd aside, vaeate and 
annul the decrees of adoption heretofore entered and 
make such other further order as may be proper in the 
premises. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
GL;STIX, RICHARDS & l\IATTSSON, 
Attorneys for Rhea \Valker Brown, 
Protestant and Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
